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Abstract  
 
The aim of my study is to suggest guidelines for collaborative ethical reflection in 
evaluation practice in multiactor networks, in which there is a need for cooperation in 
order to fit together multiple points of view, traditions, and interests; to resolve eventual 
conflicts in interactional context. In the first article I illustrated the complexity of 
composing framework that can ensure clear guidelines for ethical evaluation practice in 
specific contextual situations and in a complex operational environment with conflicting 
role expectations. For this purpose, I studied, applying philosophical analysis, (a) the 
discourse ethical perspective, which emphasizes the normative features of the use of 
language (Searle, Habermas); (b) Newman and Brown’s heuristic model for ethical 
reflection in evaluation, which draws attention to a range of sources an evaluator may 
need to integrate to inform ethical decisions; and (c) a postmodern framework designed 
to serve as a description of the ethical perspectives for which an evaluator is morally 
responsible. The fourth article connects the findings of the first article to the 
argumentative perspective of evaluation. The results indicate that from speech acts it 
may be impossible either to logically derive moral duties or obligations to act, or to 
present idealising suppositions of such rules for dialogical situations as would ensure 
the production of universal norms for participants in a conversation. However, the 
argumentation process is fruitful especially when the participants can set mutual 
understanding as a goal and commit to aspiring to that goal—although it will be 
impossible to reach it perfectly in practice. Neither using extensive principles nor 
reflecting on several theories can ensure a clear view of the situation. The ethics of 
evaluation is mostly concerned with balancing conflicting principles and values. 
Therefore, in ethical reflection, the focus should be on commitment to a certain 
reflective, professional way of life in which the identifying and acquiring professional 
virtues have an important role. 
In the second article, the perspective is extended by analyzing the dynamics of the 
development of cooperation in multiactor networks from the viewpoint of the third 
generation of activity theory, which gives a constructive perspective on how 
contradictions can be a driving force behind interorganizational learning and 
development. In the third article, this approach is applied in analyzing the results of a 
case study of the contradictory position of evaluators in situations where cooperational 
iv 
 
relationships and professional networks are close. This perspective is then extended by 
applying the postmodern model for ethical reflection discussed in the first article. From 
the activity theoretical perspective, the ethical issues reflect contradictions, which can 
be a starting point for development, if the actors can become collectively oriented in the 
analysis of a contradictory situation, and in the modeling, implementation, and 
examination of a new solution. In this endeavor, the multivoiced character of the 
network of interacting activity systems in the evaluation process needs to be taken into 
consideration. For example, the people involved in the evaluation process could create a 
collaborative forum in which different essential perspectives can be taken into account 
in order to solve ethical problems. In this kind of process, it is possible to apply the 
postmodern model for ethical reflection in order to obtain a shared construction of the 
essential operational principles and their balance in the evaluation process.  
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Introduction 
1. Ethical challenges, argumentation, and interorganizational learning  
 
Evaluation differs from research in its explicit, indeed required, determination of the 
merit, worth, or value of what is researched (Scriven, 1991; Wolf et al., 2009, p. 171). It 
provides usable information to support decisions about program or policy operations 
and effectiveness (Wolf et al., 2009). Therefore, it plays an important role in the choice 
of the public policy instruments with which governmental authorities wield their power 
when attempting to ensure support and to effect social change (e.g. Bemelmans-Videc 
& Vedung, 2003; House, 2006; Simons, 2006; Schwandt, 2007). Evaluation is 
inherently political due to the interactions of various stakeholders in evaluation, as they 
articulate their interests from different positions of power, influence, and authority (e.g. 
Datta, 2011). The operational context of evaluation is ethically challenging. As Simons 
(2006, p. 243) depicts:   
Drawing attention to the interdependence of politics and ethics and conflicts among 
principles, highlights the unique nature of the evaluation task and the key responsibilities of 
the evaluation role. Evaluation involves at least four levels of social-political interaction - 
with government and other agency policy makers who commission evaluation; with 
participants in the programmes, policies and institutions evaluated; with the evaluation 
profession; and with the wider audiences to whom evaluators in a democratic society have 
a responsibility to report. Evaluation has to operate in this multilayered context of different 
interests, providing information to inform decisions while remaining independent of the 
policies and programmes themselves. In such a context it is not surprising that ethical 
dilemmas arise as to which is the best course of action to take. 
 
The situations of evaluation are inevitably complex and various, often involving 
conflicts between ethical principles as well as among the aims or claims of stakeholders 
(Schweigert, 2007). Addressing the competing and often conflicting values of different 
members of an evaluation audience is a necessary and difficult task in evaluation 
(Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007, p. 13, p. 21). In this task, the principles, standards, 
and codes designed to facilitate ethical professional practice are important guidelines.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Ethical rules are specific statements about ethical behavior; ethical codes are compilations of 
ethical rules. Ethical standards can be synonymous with ethical rules and codes but may go 
beyond that definition to suggest model behavior. Ethical principles are broader than rules and 
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However, it is argued that there is no context-free abstract set of standards or principles 
that can be applied to guide ethical decision making in evaluation. In practice, 
evaluators encounter ethical dilemmas, where they have to make complex judgments, 
choices between alternative courses of action, taking into account a myriad of factors - 
social, personal, political, cultural - that are pertinent in the particular context (House, 
1980; Lincoln, 1990; Mabry, 1999; Pring, 2000; Simons, 2006). The evaluators have to 
make decisions case by case regarding the applicability and appropriate balance of the 
principles of the applied use of research methods (Goodyear, 2007; Schweigert, 2007, 
Wolf et al., 2009).  
The challenging context of ethical decision making in evaluation has motivated 
various research activities. Picciotto (2005) for one has proposed an assessment 
framework for rating evaluation standards and suggests a participatory elaboration of 
global evaluation standards. Virtanen and Laitinen (2004) have designed a framework 
designed to serve as a description of the ethical perspectives for which an evaluator is 
morally responsible. Schweigert (2007) has provided a framework of justice to guide 
practitioners in clarifying the conflicts between ethical principles and among the aims of 
stakeholders. There is also empirical research on the ethical challenges that evaluators 
face in practice. Morris and Clark (2009), Morris and Jacobs (2000), and Turner (2003), 
for example, have done empirical research that identifies and explores the ethical 
challenges encountered by evaluators during the various phases of an evaluation. Wolf 
et al. (2009) have done exploratory research that presents composite pictures of the 
various ways evaluators think about ethics in their practices. Also, research that 
                                                                                                                                               
serve as the foundation for codes. Principles stand as models of behaviour and practice, 
providing and encompassing not only situational rules but also serving as guides for unspecified 
practice (Newman & Brown, 1996, p. 22).  Many evaluation associations, such as those in 
France, Germany, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand, have developed national standards or guides for evaluation practice that are 
significantly geared to ethical matters (Picciotto, 2005; Wolf et al., 2009). In practice, some 
evaluation societies have set standards to judge the quality of the evaluation and the product.  
For example, the Joint Committee on Standards has published the second and third editions of 
the Program Evaluation Standards (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 
1994; Yarbrough et al., 2011). Others prefer more general statements of principle for the 
conduct of evaluation (e.g. Australasian Evaluation Society, Canadian Evaluation Society), 
accompanied in some cases by guidelines for interpreting the principles in practice. One 
example is the five principles (systematic inquiry, competence, integrity/honesty, respect for 
people, and responsibilities for general and public welfare) listed by the American Evaluation 
Association’s (1995, 2004) Guiding Principles for Evaluators. Yet others are couched in terms of 
more regulative rules or codes which promote and protect the profession and the public and to 
which members of a society must subscribe. (See Simons, 2006.) 
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compares evaluators’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of ethical concerns has been 
done (e.g. Alexander & Richman, 2008; Morris, 2007; see Morris, 2011). Furthermore, 
there are guideline developmental activities that reflect a shift in emphasis from 
technical issues of competent research practice to wider social and professional 
considerations. An example of this is the revised version of the Program Evaluation 
Standards (Yarbrough et al., 2011), which illustrates a wider view of evaluator 
responsibilities, reflecting interest in issues surrounding the commissioning of 
evaluation and the nature of stakeholder involvement in setting evaluation parameters as 
well as concerns about how evaluation results are used and how they fit into the ‘bigger 
picture’ of social change (see Wolf et al., 2009).  
These research activities provide important perspectives on this challenging field. 
In order to meet the challenges of ethical decision making in evaluation, we need a 
participatory elaboration of common guidelines as well as frameworks that take into 
account different ethical perspectives as well as conflicts between ethical principles and 
among the aims of stakeholders. 
This study focuses on sketching guidelines for ethical reflection in evaluation in a 
multilayered context of different interests where evaluators have to address competing 
and even conflicting values and principles. Firstly, I illustrated the complexity of 
composing a framework that can ensure clear guidelines for ethical evaluation practice 
in specific contextual situations and in a complex operational environment with 
conflicting role expectations. For this purpose I studied, applying philosophical 
analysis, (a) the discourse ethical perspective, which emphasizes the normative features 
of the use of language (Searle, Habermas); (b) Newman and Brown’s (1996) heuristic 
framework for ethical reflection in evaluation, which draws attention to a range of 
sources that evaluators may need to integrate in order to inform ethical decisions; and 
(c) a postmodern framework designed to serve as a description of the ethical 
perspectives for which an evaluator is morally responsible (Laitinen, 2002; Virtanen & 
Laitinen, 2004; Laitinen, 2008). Secondly, I extended the perspective on the 
contradictory position of evaluators using activity theory, which gives a constructive 
perspective on how contradictions can be a driving force behind interorganizational 
learning and development in multiactor networks. The activity theoretical perspective is 
applied in analyzing the results of a case study of an agency evaluation and in 
suggesting guidelines for collaborative ethical reflection. 
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The starting point is that in governmental evaluation markets, evaluators are acting 
in a complex operational environment, in multiactor networks, in which they have to 
take various roles, including those of a consultant/administrator, a data 
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Figure 1. Evaluation activities, phase, and evaluator role responses  
(Skolits et al., 2009) 
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collector/researcher, a reporter, a member of the evaluation profession, a member of the 
same professional network as the evaluand, and a member of society. The complexity of 
assuming these multiple roles and meeting their demands frequently creates conflicts for 
the evaluator and results in ethical dilemmas – situations involving choices between 
equally unsatisfactory alternatives. The practical morality of evaluators has to do with 
making choices among conflicting values and principles (e.g. Newman & Brown, 
1996). Skolits et al. (2009) have pointed out that typical evaluation activities create 
functional demands on evaluators, and that evaluators respond to these demands through 
a limited number of specified evaluator roles: manager, detective, designer, negotiator, 
diplomat, researcher, judge, reporter, use advocate, and learner (Figure 1). Also they 
maintain that “given the number, complexity, continued occurrence of multiple 
evaluator roles (primary and secondary roles) -- , there is an extremely strong potential 
for multiple role conflicts during an evaluation process” (Skolits et al., 2009, p. 293). 
As  Laitinen (2008) depicts, when the utilization of evaluation is emphasized, the 
focus is on that evaluator’s action presupposes a readiness to meet conflicting or 
different preconceived notions about the roles. For example, in situations where 
evaluation demands high level expertise, the members of evaluation peer groups may 
come from the same professional network as the evaluands – it may not be possible to 
find completely external experts who know the field well enough to be evaluators 
(Valovirta, 2000; Article III). In such a situation, an administrator who belongs to the 
same professional network as the evaluands - being a member of the evaluation peer 
group - may face a challenge to search for a balance between the ethical ideals attached 
to his or her role a) as an external evaluator (professional ethics), b) as a representative 
of his or her own organization competing for the same resources with the evaluand 
(administrative ethics), and c) as a partner in the same network as the evaluand 
(personal ethics) (Article III).  
The complexity of this situation can be depicted from the viewpoint of Lundquist’s 
(1991) model (Figure 2), which illustrates how the ideals and the regulative norms form 
networks of conflicting principles that need to be balanced in practice.
2
 According to the 
                                                 
2 The main values of administrative operations include, in addition to a shared advantage, the 
responsibility of the official for the legality of his actions, economic values (economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness), the principle of good service (customer orientation), the general principles of 
administrative law (being bound to the purpose of administration, objectivity, relativity, and 
equality), the principles of good administrative practice (the principles of right of access and 
transparency), human rights (the Declaration of Human Rights, the European Agreement of 
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model, the administrators must, all at the same time, be loyal to their superiors, obey the 
laws, and consider the views of their clients. Similarly to all administrators, they should 
share the general ethics of public administration as a consequence of the publicity of 
official positions. In addition, the administrator’s ethical consideration also includes 
professional and personal ethics as well as various other values. Additionally, the role of 
evaluator brings more ideals and norms. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Human Rights), and environmental considerations. The regulative norms form networks of 
principles that administrators use when they function in practice. In the multiactor context, in the 
changing operational environment, the practical morality of administrators relates to making 
choices among conflicting values and principles (see Moilanen, 1999, pp. 54–55; Article I). 
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Law 
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Figure 2. The main components of administrative ethics in the changing 
operational context (Lundquist, 1991; Moilanen, 1999; Huotari, 
2001, Article I) 
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It must be noticed that the role of evaluation is contextual. Valovirta (2000, 2002) 
has recognized that two dimensions, the degree of pressure for change and the relation 
between conflict and consensus, seem to profoundly affect the role that evaluations play 
within the management environment of agencies (Figure 3). 
On the one hand, the relations between stakeholders may be consensual: there is agreement 
about aims and general satisfaction with the existing structures. On the other hand, the 
relations may be conflict-laden: stakeholders disagree fundamentally about the necessary 
course of action and even the definition of the problem. This consensus–conflict dimension 
is one characteristic of the evaluation context. Another important dimension runs between 
the poles of low and high pressure for change and reform. People may be extremely 
conscious that the situation should not be as it is, but this has not led to change. Or there 
may be low pressure for change because people have not encountered any real problems or 
have not felt any need for change. (Valovirta, 2002, p. 76) 
 
 
Especially when the context where evaluation takes place is conflict laden with 
high expectations of channeling the existing pressures for change in the organization, 
the evaluator may feel challenged to take controversies and problems into account. The 
evaluator may be drawn into the middle of disputes and power struggles (Valovirta, 
2000, 2002; Article III). 
I 
AUDITOR / 
AWAKENER 
consensus 
low pressure 
for change 
conflict 
IV 
REFEREE / 
CONFLICT 
MANAGER 
III 
CONCILIATOR / 
LEGITIMIZER 
II 
REFORM 
AGENT 
high 
pressure 
for change 
Figure 3. Explaining the role of evaluation by its context (Valovirta, 2002) 
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In his study, Valovirta (2002) applies the argumentative approach used in policy 
analysis to clarify the argumentative role of the analyst and to develop interactive 
approaches that facilitate dialogue among analysts and participants (Fischer & Forester 
1993; Fischer 2003). The argumentative approach, heavily influenced by the work of 
Jürgen Habermas, seeks to theoretically and practically integrate methodological and 
substantive policy issues with institutional and political practices.
 3
 In the process, it 
illuminates the ways policy analysts make practical arguments to diverse professional 
and political audiences. Employing concepts from rhetoric and communications theory, 
it examines how such arguments can be persuasive in ways that can potentially generate 
new capacity-giving consensus (Fischer, 2003, pp. 182-183). 
The goal is to improve policy argumentation by illuminating contentious questions, 
identifying the strengths and limitations of supporting evidence, and elucidating the 
political implications of contending positions. In the process, the task is to increase 
communicative competencies, deliberative capacities and social learning. (Fischer, 2003, 
pp. 201-202) 
 
From the argumentative perspective, evaluation consists of different kinds of 
statements, which become matters of individual interpretation, collective argumentation, 
and decision making in interactional contexts. The reasoning process in evaluation 
produces arguments that are communicated as text and speech for evaluation users. 
These arguments then become part of the social processes of discussion, dialogue, and 
negotiations, which may lead to decisions and other kinds of effects (Valovirta, 2002). 
According to Valovirta (2002, 68), an evaluation utilization process comprises four 
phases (Figure 4). First, people participate in an evaluation process and read the 
evaluation reports, the substance of which they interpret on their own. The presented 
                                                 
3
 As Fischer and Forester (1993, p. 14) sum up, the argumentative turn in policy analysis and 
planning represents practical, theoretical, and political advances in the field. Practically, the 
focus on argumentation makes it possible to closely examine the communicative and rhetorical 
strategies that planners and analysts use to direct attention to the problems and options that 
they are assessing. Theoretically, the focus on argumentation enables recognition of the 
complex ways analysts not only solve but formulate problems, the ways their arguments 
express or resist broader relations of power and belief, and the ways their practical arguments 
are inescapably both normative and descriptive. Finally, the focus on argumentation can reveal 
both the micro politics of planners’ and analysts’ agenda setting, selective representations, and 
claims, and the macro politics of analysts’ participation in larger discourses, whether those are 
articulated in relatively organized discourse coalitions or through more diffuse, if perhaps more 
subtly influential, ideologies and systems of political belief. 
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arguments are re-evaluated, leading to new and transformed comprehensions, the 
confirmation of existing beliefs, or refutation. In policy making and organizational 
action, these individual interpretations also become the subject of collective deliberation 
and decision making, where argumentation by persuasion, legitimization, criticism, and 
defense plays the central role. Finally, these interactions may result in decisions and 
actions, new shared understandings, and a new level of legitimacy. 
 
 
In his approach, Valovirta (2002, p. 63) emphasizes argumentation as a particular 
kind of language-driven interaction where contradictions open up possibilities from 
learning from others’ viewpoints.  
The second meaning of argument refers to argumentation as a particular kind of language-
driven interaction among people. Billig (1987) differentiates it from ’the pretty company’, 
where ‘everyone agrees with each other’ (p. 83), which leaves no room for new 
comprehensions and insights to emerge. The shift from polite, harmonious discussion into 
an argumentative one takes place through contradiction (Billig, 1987: 85). Contradiction 
does not, however, necessarily ‘imply ill-will or loss of temper’ (Billig, 1987: 84). Instead, 
it opens up possibilities for learning from others’ viewpoints. It consists of arguments and 
counterarguments, thus constituting a ‘natural dialect’ (Huff, 1998), where gaining greater 
understanding and new comprehensions by collective deliberation is possible. 
New and 
transformed 
comprehensions 
Persuading 
Confirmed 
comprehensions 
Refutation 
Decisions, 
actions 
Strengthened or 
weakened 
legitimacy 
New shared 
comprehensions 
Increased 
awareness 
Legitimizing 
Criticizing 
Defending 
Interpretation 
Argumentation and 
decision making Effects 
Figure 4. The utilization process of evaluation (Valovirta, 2002) 
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The central role of contradictions as a driving force behind change and 
development can be understood more profoundly from the perspective of activity 
theory. The approach permits human activity to be defined as a self-directing system 
that develops by resolving internal contradictions and external contradictions between 
the system and the environment. Contradictions are not the same as problems or 
conflicts; they are historically accumulating structural tensions within and between 
activity systems. On the one hand, contradictions appear in the work as disturbances, 
breaks, and dilemmas, and on the other hand, as innovations - attempts to resolve the 
contradictions of human activity individually or together in a new way (Engeström, 
1987, 1995, 2005; Article II).
4
 
Activity systems move through relatively long cycles of expansive learning (Figure 
5). As the contradictions of an activity system are aggravated, some participants begin 
to question and deviate from its established norms. In some cases, this escalates into 
cooperative envisioning and a deliberate collective change effort. A cycle of expansive 
learning is accomplished when the object and motive of the activity are 
reconceptualized to embrace a radically wider horizon of possibilities than in the former 
mode of the activity. A full cycle of expansive learning may be understood as a 
                                                 
4
 Disturbances are discoordinations appearing in the course of activity and interaction. They are 
involuntary anomalies in the normal course of the work process assumed in planning, 
regulations, or tradition (‘manuscript’). Disturbances appear between a person and the material 
environment (for example, machines and appliances) or between persons. The disturbances in 
human interaction are usually difficulties in mutual comprehension, disagreements, rejections, 
and counterarguments between the participants.  
A break is a barrier, a gap in mutual understanding and information between two or more 
participants. In actual communication situations they appear as silence or passivity. The breaks 
often end in explicit disturbances, misunderstandings, and disagreements.  
A dilemma is a contradiction influential in the activity, speech, and thoughts of participants. It 
appears as hesitation, reservation, fluctuations between two possibilities, inconsistent attitudes, 
and even self-disputation. In speech they usually are manifested as hesitations and 
reservations, with several “but” words and negatives. Dilemmas do not necessarily end in 
disturbances, but they demonstrate tensions and contradictions in an activity system.  
Innovations are more or less conscious initiatives to exceed the manuscript (the current 
activity) in order to produce a novel idea or solution. Implementation, transmission, and 
entrenchment usually require that the initiative is accepted in the work community – otherwise it 
remains an innovation attempt. A successful innovation is realized in a new instrument or 
procedure, which is put into action. It is sometimes impossible to determine the difference 
between innovation and disturbance; both of them are deviations from the manuscript. One 
worker’s innovation may be experienced as a disturbance, and correspondingly, a disturbance 
may result in innovation. (Engeström, 1995, pp. 65-67) 
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collective journey through the zone of proximal development of the activity, which is 
the distance between the present everyday actions of the individuals and the historically 
new form of the societal activity that can be collectively generated as a solution to a 
‘double bind’ potentially embedded in everyday actions (Engeström, 1987, 2001, 2005). 
 
 
For example, the developmental dynamics of a research activity can be analyzed as 
cycles of expansion in which the emerging problems and contradictions of the activity 
are resolved. Each phase in an evolving research activity raises basic problems and 
challenges that the group or laboratory group leader must resolve in constructing a 
research agenda or doing “alignment work” (Saari & Miettinen, 2001, p. 304).  
In evaluation research, the activity theoretical perspective is applied in 
developmental impact evaluation (Saari & Kallio, 2011), which resembles the 
participatory, developmental, and empowerment evaluation approaches (e.g. Dart & 
Davies, 2003; Fetterman, 2001; Friedman, 2001; Garaway, 1995; Greene, 1997; Patton, 
1994, 1997, 2010; Torres & Preskill, 2001) that contend that learning from evaluations 
is possible if different stakeholders are involved. In developmental impact evaluation, 
the process is used explicitly as a basis for learning and for constructing new plans 
(Saari & Kallio, 2011). 
Prevailing practice 
Need state 
 
Double bind: 
The analysis of 
contradictions, 
discovering the 
‘springboard’  
 
 Modeling and 
developing the new 
solution  
 
 
Implementation and 
generalization  
The change of the activity 
system 
 
A new mode of action: 
consolidation and 
reflection 
Figure 5. A cycle of expansive learning (Engeström, 2001, 2005) 
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It needs to be noted, however, that by focusing on local activity systems the 
approach cannot address the macro-social and political processes that shape and inform 
the elements of local activity systems (e.g. Avis, 2009; Peim, 2009). The participants 
may not have equal opportunities to participate in questioning, learning and decision 
making in local activity systems. Despite this limitation, the approach provides a 
valuable framework for analyzing interorganizational learning processes. Expansive 
learning theory considers the phenomenon of organizational learning to be something 
that takes place not only inside an organization but also between organizations. It sees 
learning not as restricted to the knowledge acquisition of the individual mind (the 
traditional perspective), or as a process of becoming an active participator in cultural 
practices (the sociocultural perspective), but conceptualizes learning as knowledge 
creation, which refers to the innovative and explorative processes of co-creating 
something that does not yet exist (see Engeström, 2004; Paavola et al., 2010; Saari & 
Kallio, 2011).  
 
 
2. Aim and method 
 
The aim of my study is to suggest guidelines for collaborative ethical reflection in 
evaluation practice in multiactor networks, in which evaluators have to meet conflicting 
or different preconceived notions about their roles and cooperate in order to reconcile 
multiple points of view, traditions, and interests; to resolve eventual conflicts in the 
interactional context. In the first article, I illustrated the complexity of composing a 
framework that can ensure clear guidelines for ethical evaluation practice in specific 
contextual situations and in complex operational environment with conflicting role 
expectations. For this purpose, I studied, applying philosophical analysis, (a) the 
discourse ethical perspective, which emphasizes the normative features of the use of 
language (Searle, Habermas); (b) Newman and Brown’s (1996) heuristic model for 
ethical reflection in evaluation, which draws attention to a range of sources that 
evaluators may need to integrate to inform their ethical decisions; and (c) a postmodern 
framework designed to serve as a description of the ethical perspectives for which an 
evaluator is morally responsible (Laitinen 2002, Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004; Laitinen 
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2008). The fourth article connects the findings of the first article to the argumentative 
perspective of evaluation. 
In the second article, the perspective is extended by analyzing the dynamics of the 
development of cooperation in multiactor networks from the viewpoint of the third 
generation of activity theory, which gives a constructive perspective on how 
contradictions can be a driving force behind interorganizational learning and 
development in multiactor networks. This approach is then applied in the third article in 
analyzing the results of a case study (Huotari, 2003) on a contradictory position of 
evaluators in situations where co-operational relationships and professional networks 
are close. The case study addressed an agency-level institutional evaluation in Finland. 
In the case study, 21 people who were involved in the production of evaluation 
information (1998-2001) were interviewed after the evaluation process in 2002. The 
snowball sampling method was used in order to ensure that different viewpoints were 
heard—those of representatives of (a) the orderer of the evaluation, (b) the evaluators, 
(c) the heads of units during the evaluation, and (d) the members of the agency’s 
management group. The main themes in the interviews were (1) the main ethical 
problems and dilemmas in the external evaluation of the agency, and (2) evaluation as 
an instrument of the management. In the article, the activity theoretical perspective is 
then extended by applying the postmodern model for ethical reflection discussed in the 
first article. 
 
 
3. The main results and implications 
3.1. Communication and commitment  
 
Communication is an essential element in the evaluation process. Therefore, from an 
ethical perspective, the question of the illocutionary force of utterances is important: 
does the use of language itself have normative features? The study of the approaches of 
Searle and Habermas, however, indicate that from speech acts it is impossible either to 
logically derive value propositions, moral duties, or obligations to act, or to present the 
idealizing suppositions of such rules for dialogical situations as would ensure the 
production of universal norms for participants in a conversation. The use of language 
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itself has normative features only when the speaker at the same time commits to take the 
promise seriously (Articles I & IV). 
Searle (1969, 1979, 1999) has endeavored to explain how the speech act of 
promising creates a moral obligation. According to Searle, the speech act of promising 
is an institutional fact pertaining to a certain institutional context, from which it is 
possible to logically derive an obligation to act, the value proposition.  
In making the utterance, the speaker commits himself to acting in such a way so that his 
future behavior will come to match the prepositional content of the utterance. (Searle, 
1999; 2008, p. 175) 
 
However, Mackie (1977) has argued that it is not possible to derive a moral duty in 
the way Searle proposes; institutional facts are not ordinary facts. The uttering of a 
promise constitutes an obligation only when the speaker at the same time commits to 
take the promise seriously. It is possible to speak about duties without making them 
one’s moral burden. The promise given earnestly is quite a different matter than the 
mention of a promise (Mackie, 1977; Airaksinen, 1993). It seems impossible to attempt 
to logically derive an obligation to act from speech acts. The above attempt, however, 
makes it clear that the concept of commitment should be an essential theme of ethical 
reflection in evaluation.  
The emphasis of the speech act theory on the illocutionary force of utterances, i.e. 
on the notion that in saying something the speaker also does something, is regarded as 
fruitful by Habermas, too. His definition of illocutionary force follows from this view: 
illocutionary force consists of a speech act’s capacity to motivate the hearer to act on 
the premise that the commitment signaled by the speaker is seriously meant (Cooke, 
1998). 
In his theory, Habermas (1981, 1983) attempts to reconstruct the universal 
competencies that are involved when social actors interact with the aim of achieving 
mutual understanding (‘Verständigung’). By applying his social theory it is possible to 
seek ways of creating consensus through so-called communicative action. The attempt 
to achieve mutual understanding in a discussion may help to define those moral norms 
which enable one to assume that the consequences and side effects caused by the 
common observance of those rules for anyone’s private interests are, taking into 
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account the effects of known alternative means of regulation, acceptable to all the 
persons concerned.  
Habermas presents certain idealizing suppositions to guide this process of 
argumentation: openness to the public, inclusiveness, equal rights of participation, 
immunization against external or inherent compulsion, and an orientation of the 
participants towards reaching an understanding (i.e. the sincere expression of 
utterances). Furthermore, the statements uttered must be true, the speakers must believe 
in their own arguments, and any linguistically argued positions must have jointly 
accepted justification (Alexy, 1978; Habermas, 1983; 1998a, p. 367). 
Applying Habermas’ view, as did Picciotto (2005) in his text on the participatory 
elaboration of global evaluation standards, it is possible to emphasize that the role of 
rational discourse among principled individuals is the only way to generate sound 
standards for knowledge creation. In Habermas’ words:  
 
Representations and descriptions are never independent of standards. And the choice of 
these standards is based on attitudes that require critical consideration by means of 
arguments, because they cannot be either logically deduced or empirically demonstrated. 
(Habermas 1971, p. 312) 
 
However, it is stated that the mutual understanding achieved by communication can 
be local only (Lyotard, 1979, 1984). Also, there is good reason to ask whether the exact 
rules set to the nature of speech situations are too idealistic and whether the 
universalism masks part of its own ideals: freedom, self-realization, and creativity. 
Furthermore, it is not self-evident that the participants in communication will actually 
choose an orientation towards reaching understanding as their goal and refrain from 
using power. Additionally, the essential question here is to what extent the actors, who 
are professionally committed to strategic action, can also commit to the communicative 
use of language, in which “the participating actors must conduct themselves 
cooperatively and attempt to harmonize their plans with one another (within the horizon 
of a shared life world) on the basis of common (or sufficiently overlapping) 
interpretations of the situation” (Habermas, 1998b, p. 299).  
This criticism does not prevent one from thinking, however, that the argumentation 
process is fruitful especially when the participants can set mutual understanding as a 
goal and commit to aspiring to that goal – although it will be impossible to reach it 
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perfectly in practice. Normatively it is possible to set inevitable but general conditions 
for such communicative everyday practice and discursive will-formation as might place 
the persons concerned in a situation in which they were able, on their own initiative and 
according to their own needs and views, to realize some concrete opportunities for a 
better and safer life (Habermas, 1985).  
 
 
3.2. Ethical decision making and virtues 
 
However, in the evaluation process, it is not only the organizing of different views and 
action plans so as to reach a mutual understanding that advances the utilization of 
evaluation through argumentation. It is, above all, complicated to compose a framework 
that can ensure clear guidelines for ethical evaluation practice in specific contextual 
situations and in a complex operational environment with conflicting role expectations. 
Neither the application of extensive principles nor reflection on several theories can 
ensure a clear view of the situation. This challenges evaluators to commit themselves to 
a certain reflective, professional way of life in which developing ethical skills and 
identifying and acquiring professional virtues have an important role (Articles I & IV). 
As Newman and Brown (1996) have depicted, the standards and ethical codes and 
theories are useful but will always be insufficient in themselves as guidelines for ethical 
practice when rules conflict and when specific contextual situations demand unique 
responses. However, also Newman and Brown’s own framework, with its emphasis on 
five principles, has its own weaknesses with regard to taking into account multiple 
perspectives at the same time.  Newman and Brown (1996, pp. 37-52) recommend that 
ethical decision making should involve the application of the five principles presented 
by Beauchamp and Childress (1983) and by Kitchener (1984) - autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and fidelity - which “are broader than specific 
rules, and they provide helpful, although not absolute, guidance when rules conflict and 
when specific contextual situations demand unique responses” (Newman and Brown, 
1996, p. 191). These five principles play a key role in Newman and Brown’s (1996, pp. 
101-119) flowchart (see Article I, figure 1), which is meant as a heuristic tool for ethical 
decision making in program evaluation. The starting point is an intuitive feeling of 
potential ethical conflict, followed by an attempt to find whether there is a specific rule 
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that suits the situation. If necessary, one then conducts an analysis on the basis of 
ethical principles and criteria (theories), and reflects on the solution with respect to 
one’s own set of values. 
It needs to be noted, however, that these principles (autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence, justice, and fidelity) may conflict with each other. From whose point of 
view, then, are the actions more just, more beneficial, or more faithful? When should we 
give preference to professional autonomy over fidelity or beneficence? In what 
situations are choices seriously affected by the evaluator’s own beliefs and values? 
Applying the principlist view, one may appeal to ethical theory as a useful heuristic aid 
in making an ethical decision about how to resolve such conflicts between ethical 
principles, “but ethical theory does not deductively support a univocal decision about 
which principle takes preeminence” (Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009, p. 19). The solutions 
offered by different moral theories (criteria) may also lead to conflicting value 
judgments, which is a serious problem. As Virtanen (2004, p. 18) depicts, in ethics the 
“different paradigms and schools of thought compete, utilitarian theories with 
deontological theories, utilitarian and deontological theories with virtue theories, 
egalitarian theories of justice with libertarian theories, and so forth.” However, an 
attempt can be made to balance the criteria to obtain the best overall combination, or 
they can be differentially emphasized, and in this process the evaluator’s personal ethics 
play an important role. When the different criteria applied to the situation do not 
conflict, it is possible to obtain a diversified view. (See Airaksinen, 1993, p. 24; 
Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009, p. 19.)  
As Simons (2006) argues, while Newman and Brown’s (1996) framework “may 
appear overly rationalistic, given the uncertainty, complexity and finely tuned 
professional judgment we have to make in the ‘ethical moment’, it draws our attention 
to a range of sources that we may need to integrate to inform the ethical decisions we 
make.” The different definitions and theories are indeed useful in their own places and 
functions. By analyzing matters from many viewpoints, without a commitment to one 
single moral concept system, it is possible to try to avoid the problems of moral 
consideration: no one ethical framework is strong enough to resolve the issue on its 
own. (See Airaksinen, 1993, pp. 23-24, p. 112, p. 218.)  
The importance and challenges of analyzing matters from many viewpoints can be 
clearly seen through a postmodern model designed by the Finnish Evaluation Society 
(FES) to initiate discussion about the principles of evaluation, and to serve as a 
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description of the ethical perspectives for which an evaluator is morally responsible. 
The starting point in this endeavor was that although the current evaluation standards 
can be used to illustrate a good evaluation process, they have limited applicability 
(Virtanen 2004, Virtanen & Laitinen 2004, Virtanen 2007). Evaluation standards can 
contribute to spreading knowledge about professional conduct in the field of evaluation, 
they have been used for educational purposes in training and as a benchmark for quality 
in carrying out evaluation studies, and they have also fostered a common language 
between evaluators and those commissioning evaluations (Virtanen, 2004, p. 27, 2007).  
However, by following the guidelines set out in various standards, one cannot be sure 
that evaluation is automatically of good quality and ethically of “high class”. 
Evaluation standards as they currently exist, actually express very little with regard to 
values, and even where they do, the content of these values remain obscure. This means 
that standards remain as lists of proposed good practice. Related to the previous point, it 
would be naïve to assume that ethical codes as such could exist in a way that everybody 
conceives or interprets them in the same manner. -- . Evaluation standards cannot provide 
‘miracle’ solutions. By following the guidelines set out in various standards we cannot be 
sure that the evaluation at hand is automatically of good quality and ethically of acceptable 
standards. (Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004, pp. 12-13) 
 
The standards ought to relate to a good value theory that should be a sum of the 
descriptive, prescriptive, and metatheoretical value approaches, combining their best 
elements and neglecting the worst shortcomings.
5
  
                                                 
5
 According to Shadish et al. (1991), a better theory of this value component consists of the 
following elements. 
 Firstly, it should “describe all of the elements laid down in descriptive, prescriptive and 
metatheoretical approaches.” Descriptive valuing is a description of stakeholder values 
without claiming that one is the best in comparison to other values. Prescriptive ethical 
theories, then, advocate the primacy of particular values. Metatheory refers to the study 
of the nature of valuing and to the analysis of justification for valuing. It describes how 
and why value statements are constructed, underlines the structure or logic of valuing, 
and tries to reveal the nature of justifications for values. 
 Secondly, it should “recognize clearly that no prescriptive theory is widely accepted as 
best - all prescriptive ethics are unjustified and selecting one immediately involves 
trade-offs - and that prescriptive theories suffer from inconsistency, since today’s 
society is based on fostering pluralism of values, competing against each other.” 
 Therefore, thirdly, it should “clearly state its priorities about which kinds of values to 
attend and to address, and why” (Virtanen, 2004, p. 19). 
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Furthermore, Virtanen (2004) argued that due to counter-intentional and 
unconscious biases in our behavior (implicit forms of prejudice, bias that favors one’s 
own group, conflicts of interest, and a tendency to over claim credit), one can ask 
whether it is possible to control the quality of evaluation through standards at all. 
Additionally, from the constructive perspective, “meaning and knowledge (including 
evaluation values and norms) are constructed and not ‘found’ in things and events. 
These worlds are constructed in the minds of evaluators in concrete places at specific 
times, under the constraints present in those times and places, and they build new 
constraints for other places and new times. Evaluation standards and ethical guidelines 
provide advice that is not salient enough to be evaluated from a constructive 
perspective.” (Virtanen, 2004, p. 23) The use of standards and guidelines is highly 
personal and individual, and practical applications vary greatly; they vary from one 
situation to another and do not transcend time and place. The standards and ethical 
guidelines do not provide ethical advice in the changing situations that an evaluator 
encounters in carrying out her or his evaluation mission (Virtanen, 2004, pp. 23-24). 
Virtanen and Laitinen (2004) also considered the current nature of postmodern 
morality and ethics in order to understand the limits of the applicability of evaluation 
standards. They argued that if Bauman (1995, 1997) is right in arguing that morality and 
ethics are not universal today in the same way that they perhaps used to be, no logically 
coherent ethical code can ‘fit’ the essentially ambivalent condition of postmodernity. 
“Moral phenomena are today inherently ‘non-rational’ in the sense that they are not 
regular, repetitive, monotonous and predictable in a way that would allow them to be 
represented as rule guided. This kind of reasoning does not leave much room for any 
codes of ethics in evaluation practice, at least as they are available today” (Virtanen, 
2004, p. 24). 
The Finnish Evaluation Society (FES) has confronted the vital need for ethical 
guidelines and self-oversight of the evaluation community by developing the current 
evaluation standards and raising ethical perspectives on evaluation (Virtanen & 
Laitinen, 2004). This model, using Wolf’s et al. (2009, p. 173) words, “starts with the 
main ‘aggregates’ in any evaluation and deduces a key principle for each. The four 
aggregate-principle pairs are the evaluator (the principle of truth), the object of 
evaluation (‘justness’), the process (ability), and the community (responsibility).” 
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Figure 6.  The FES’s  framework for ethical reflection 
Object of Evaluation—Justness 
The value field of interaction is 
attached to the morals of right and 
wrong action in terms of the ethics of 
coexistence and reciprocity. The 
ethics of the social space, 
coexistence, are concerned with the 
reciprocal and sincere meeting of 
the subjects. The values of these 
ethics are caring, justice, and 
solidarity. In this connection, 
reciprocity means the ability to put 
oneself in the situation of less 
advantaged people (Laitinen, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002).  
Thus, the fair treatment of evaluation 
participants means taking into 
consideration their rights and 
treating them in a righteous manner 
(Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004). 
Resources                    Being Interaction              Regeneration 
Evaluation Process—Ability  
The value field of doing is attached to 
the morals of right and wrong and to 
the ethics of action. The essential 
value principles in this field are 
capability (including the mastery of 
processes and methods), 
responsibility, veracity, and impartiality 
(Laitinen, 2001a, 2001b, 2002).  
The evaluator is expected to rely on 
valid evaluation methods and 
procedures, this being the core of an 
evaluator’s professional ability. 
Evaluation is also always a product of 
cooperation and is thus attached to 
the surrounding community, at least 
indirectly. The premise here is that 
integrity and fairness are realized in 
the evaluation process and that the 
process provides socially relevant 
information (Virtanen & Laitinen, 
2004). 
Process                            Doing Having  Outcomes, effects 
Community—Responsibility 
The value field of having is attached 
to virtues and ideals that are to be 
sought because of their validity, 
community benefit, or intrinsic value. 
When acting in society as part of the 
natural environment and the world of 
participation of people, no one is 
protected from questions concerning 
oneself and the future. The essential 
value dimensions emerging in this 
field are security, socially and 
ecologically sustainable 
development, caring for people, 
human dignity, human treatment, 
and compliance with laws and 
statutes (Laitinen, 2001a, 2001b, 
2002). In this, the main theme is the 
responsibility for the results and the 
entitlement of the actions. The 
evaluator, the evaluation object, and 
the commissioner of an evaluation 
are always part of their surrounding 
community, and thus are neither 
independent nor self-sufficient 
(Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004). 
Evaluator—Truth 
The value field of being is attached to 
the ethics of will and to the idea of 
man. The main theoretical questions in 
this value field include the question of 
individual consciousness and its 
nature, of the freedom and the choices 
of the individual, and of his or her 
motives and aims. The model 
subsumes, as value dimensions 
pertaining to its idea of man, the 
conceptions of freedom, equality, 
honesty, good faith, and justice 
(Laitinen, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). From 
this perspective, good evaluation 
practice refers not only to value-based 
evaluation practices, but also to the 
way of perceiving the evaluator’s rights 
and responsibilities. The evaluator 
must have free access to information 
and the freedom to seek the truth. 
Truth is therefore the ultimate arbiter of 
his or her actions (Virtanen & Laitinen, 
2004). 
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In the model (Figure 6), the essential value fields are derived from four ontological 
categories based on Allardt’s (1972, 1973, 1976) application of Maslow’s (1943) need 
classification scheme: being, having, interaction, and doing. Being is attached to the 
resources of the Balanced Score Card’s systemic circle, having to outcomes and effects, 
interaction to regeneration, and doing to processes (Laitinen, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; 
Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004).  
Laitinen (2008) has developed the FES’s framework for values by connecting it to 
an existential-phenomenological model of authentic ethics that emphasizes an increased 
awareness of the self and behavior in encounters and situations. At the center of 
authentic evaluation ethics, there is a person who makes choices. In the evaluation 
process in the postmodern world, the other elements and conditions change, but the 
evaluator is always more than just his or her professional role. The evaluator is a person 
who encounters and possibly conciliates conflicts as an authentic self, who must bear 
the responsibility for the process and must aspire to find the truth. The fountain of 
authentic ethics is that person, the authentic self (Laitinen, 2008, p. 143).  
The authenticity of the person is the freedom in relation to objectification and 
definitions. The individual can give meanings to definitions from his or her own 
position. This means authentic and real being for oneself regardless of the context and 
the situation. No individual is similar to descriptions of himself or herself or the roles 
attached to him or her. Even though an attribute or a role has been defined for the 
person, individual freedom means that she or he gives the meaning to that role and 
decides how to act in relation to that objectification (Laitinen, 2008, pp. 156-157). 
In social constructions, individual existence is a continuing tension between the 
authenticity of self and that social construction. An individual belongs to some social 
construction and, accordant with individual freedom, is at a distance from it. According 
to authenticity, the individual exists differently from anyone else in that social group. In 
social construction, the individual’s authentic existence forms interactively with the 
others of the group as a continuous identity construction which is both free and a 
process. Because others objectificate me in exactly this way, my authentic existence is a 
distance from those attributes, and I am primarily faithful to my own authentic self 
(Laitinen, 2008, pp. 158-159). 
According to authentic evaluation ethics, the evaluator acts as persona, an authentic 
self, throughout the evaluation process. At the same time, he or she has an evaluator’s 
role in which he or she is a member of a scientific community and a professional 
22 
 
community, and encounters other subjects and the beneficial needs of a community or 
society. If the evaluator can, during the process or afterwards, evaluate and approve his 
or her decisions as a person and according to the terms of the role, balancing all the 
value dimensions simultaneously, he or she fulfills the requirements of the model. In 
other words, the evaluator can approve his or her decisions as a person (an authentic 
self) a) in terms of scientific veracity, b) methodological mastery and competence, c) 
the integrity of the object of evaluation, and d) social responsibility and the usefulness 
of the evaluation (Laitinen, 2008, pp. 174-175). 
It needs to be noted, however, that the values themselves may conflict with each 
other (e.g. research freedom versus securing the inviolability of communal rights). 
Thus, the value dimensions must be differently emphasized. Furthermore, as Virtanen 
and Laitinen (2004, p. 11) emphasize, the way the moral responsibility is carried at the 
end is always an evaluator’s individual choice. The emphasis is still on the evaluator’s 
personal commitment. Despite these limitations, the model offers a concrete description 
of the ethical perspectives for which an evaluator is morally responsible. It can also give 
a framework for a discussion of values, which may lead to a shared construction of 
essential values and their balance. 
The flowchart outlined by Newman and Brown (1996) and the postmodern 
framework (Laitinen, 2002, 2008; Virtanen & Laitinen, 2004) are explicitly heuristic 
tools—they do not give ready-made solutions but leave room for personal ethics. They 
help us to understand that it is necessary to develop our personal ethical reflection. The 
models also help us to realize that personal ethics is mostly concerned with balancing 
conflicting principles and values. Newman and Brown (1996, pp. 191–192) emphasize 
that making ethical choices is a cognitive process—even though it involves personal 
values—and can be enhanced through thinking, reading, discussion, and practice. They 
also think that being ethical is more than just making good ethical decisions regarding 
isolated incidents or situations; it is a professional way of life that neither removes 
conflict and stress nor provides a rulebook answer to all dilemmas. According to them, 
it necessitates a certain professional virtue: courage that “must be coupled with the 
humble acceptance that we will not always make the best decision or the best choice, 
but we will keep trying, and we trust our colleagues and clients will help us by 
providing constructive criticisms” (Newman & Brown, 1996, p. 192). 
This interesting theme of the professional virtues of the evaluator could be studied 
empirically using af Ursin’s (2007) application of MacIntyre’s (1985) approach. 
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Following MacIntyre’s theory, for example, the professional virtues of management 
consultants can be generated on three different levels or contexts, which are 1) the 
personal life story of a management consultant, 2) the practice of consulting, and 3) the 
moral inheritance and ethical discourse of the consultants’ professional society. In his 
analysis, af Ursin (2007) found ten different professional virtues for management 
consultant: the identity of management consultant, helpfulness, independence, 
objectivity, disinterestedness, loyalty to the agreement with the client, competence-
aware flexibility, process reticence, trustworthiness, and integrity with the client. In 
order to outline particularly evaluator’s professional virtues, it is possible to supplement 
this approach with the postmodern model (Laitinen, 2002, 2008; Virtanen & Laitinen, 
2004) that outlines the ethical perspectives of which an evaluator is morally responsible 
(see Figure 6). From this perspective, we can ask what professional virtues make it 
possible to fulfill the challenges of the elementary value dimensions in the different 
evaluator roles – such as in the roles of manager, detective, designer, negotiator, 
diplomat, researcher, judge, reporter, use advocate, and learner (Skolits et al., 2009).
6
 
 
 
3.3. Towards an activity theoretical reflection model  
  
The dynamics of the multiactor network of evaluation – the context where the ethical 
frameworks are applied - can be understood more profoundly from the perspective of 
the third generation of activity theory, which gives a constructive perspective on the 
challenges and possibilities in interorganizational learning in multiactor networks. From 
this perspective, the ethical issues reflect contradictions, which can be a starting point 
for development, if the actors can be collectively oriented in the analysis of a 
                                                 
6
 According to MacIntyre (1985), virtue is an acquired human quality whose possession and use 
enables one to reach such good things as have an inner relation to the practice and the lack of 
which prevents one even from gaining any corresponding value. It must be, however, noted that 
MacIntyre’s reasoning needs the support of the view that our social reality contains enough 
such extensive and significant ways of life and life plans that depend on acquired qualities, i.e. 
virtues, for their realization. This granted, life then consists of a number of social institutions and 
a number of virtues required for the effective functioning of those institutions. (See Airaksinen,  
1993.) The postmodern condition places into question the possibility of realizing the meaning of 
human life so that it provides us with an integrated whole from which virtues can be derived. 
However, there are at least specific tasks and relationships – such as the different roles of the 
evaluator, which serve as a context in which to realize virtues. 
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contradictory situation, and in the modeling, implementation, and evaluation of a new 
solution (Article III). 
From the viewpoint of activity theory, an evaluation process can be depicted as a 
network of activity systems that transforms gradually through the solution of 
contradictions.    The theory permits human activity to be defined as a system where the 
main elements are subjects, instruments, objects (and outcomes), community, rules, and 
the division of labor. The subjects refer to individuals or sub-groups whose point of 
view is used to analyze the activity. The objects refer to the problem space or ‘raw 
material’ at which the activity is directed and which is molded or transformed into 
outcomes by means of external and instrumental tools (mediating instruments and 
signs). The community comprises multiple individuals and/or sub-groups who share the 
same general objects. The division of labor refers to both the community and the 
vertical division of power and status. Rules refer to the explicit and implicit regulations, 
norms, and conventions that constrain actions and interactions within the activity 
systems (Engeström, 1987, 1995, 2001, 2007; Articles II & III). 
From the viewpoint of activity theory, the external evaluation process of the agency 
studied in the case can be depicted as a network of the interacting activity systems of the 
orderer of the evaluation, the evaluator, and the evaluand (Figure 7). In the figure, the 
outcome of the evaluation process also contains the unintended outcome - the ethical 
issues that reflect structural tensions between different intentions of the evaluation. 
According to the interviewed persons involved in the production of the evaluation 
information, there were three main ethical issues in the evaluation process (Article III): 
 
The dilemma between the autonomy of data acquisition/production and expertise in the 
choice of evaluators. The selection of the evaluators was seen as problematic, because it 
was not possible to find completely external experts who knew the field well enough to be 
evaluators. 
 
The surface nature of the data acquisition. According to this view, the time allocated to the 
evaluators remained too short, and thus the approach was superficial: At first the unit’s 
own report, then the discussions, after which came far-reaching conclusions.  
 
The use of the evaluation as a reform agent to legitimate and to expedite changes that had 
already been accepted as necessary.  
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Object:   
improvement 
of the  
situation 
through 
development 
of the  
organization 
 
Object: policy,  
strategy,  
organizational  
structure,  
personnel,  
financial  
resources,  
leadership,  
management,  
target groups, 
and the culture  
of the agency 
Tool: assesment through a 
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Figure 7.  The network of activity systems in the evaluation process of the 
agency (Article III) 
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From the viewpoint of activity theory, the ethical issues of the evaluation process 
reflect contradictions, which are the driving force of development to new solutions. The 
proper resolving of contradictions, however, is a relatively long process of expansive 
learning where the participants should become collectively oriented 1) in the profound 
analysis of the contradictory situation, 2) in the modeling of the new solution to the 
contradictions and the implementation of the new mode, and 3) in the evaluation of the 
new solution (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
Prevailing practice 
Need state: 
new challenges and 
pressures in the 
operational 
environment 
  
Double bind: 
The analysis of 
contradictions, 
discovering the 
‘springboard’  
 
 Modeling and developing the new solution  
 Constructing a new concept for the 
activity 
 The use of advanced solutions as a 
model for learning 
 New plans 
 
 
 Implementation 
and 
generalization:  
The change of 
the activity 
system 
 
 New mode of 
action: 
consolidation and 
reflection 
Local expansive change 
Single innovative solution 
Figure 8.  A cycle of expansive learning (Engeström, 1995; Saari et al., 2008; 
Kajamaa et al., 2009; Saari & Kallio, 2011) 
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In an actual-empirical analysis, the contradictions are identified, and ideation and 
argumentation are used in order to discover a first idea, a ‘springboard’, which makes 
new solutions possible. In order to more profoundly understand the problems and 
potentials of activity systems, an analysis of the history of the activity and its objects as 
well as the history of the theoretical ideas and tools that have shaped the activity is 
needed. After enough profound analyses, it is possible for the participants to model a 
new solution for the contradictions of the contemporary phase. At this phase, they also 
develop and examine the new strategic tools, as well as the new forms of division of 
labor and collaboration (Engeström, 1995, p. 90, 2001, pp. 136-137, p. 152, 2005, p. 64, 
84; Articles II & III). 
After this, the new mode of activity can be gradually implemented in everyday 
work. In this phase, there may arise so-called tertiary contradictions between the former 
and new mode of action, resistance to change. The solution of these contradictions in 
practice ends in the change of the new model of activity. Compromises and retreat, as 
well as new insights and practical solutions can be done. With the help of the assertion 
and evaluation of the new mode of activity, the collective moves into a phase where the 
new practices are systematically followed (Engeström, 1995, p. 9; Articles II & III).  
When searching for a solution to ethical issues in the evaluation process, it must be 
noticed that the network of interacting activity systems in the evaluation process is 
always multivoiced: it is a community of multiple points of view, traditions, and 
interests. 
The division of labor in an activity creates different positions for the participants, the 
participants carry their own diverse histories, and the activity system itself carries multiple 
layers and strands of history engraved in its artifacts, rules and conventions. The 
multivoicedness is multiplied in networks of interacting activity systems. It is a source of 
trouble and a source of innovation, demanding actions of translation and negotiation. 
(Engeström, 2001, p. 136) 
 
In order to take this polyphony into account, the people involved in the evaluation 
process should create some kind of collaborative forum where different essential 
perspectives can be taken into consideration. In this kind of process of collaborative 
ethical reflection, the ideal is that in a network of interacting activity systems (Figure 9) 
the object moves from an initial state of unreflected, situationally given ‘raw material’ 
(object 1; e.g. the ethical issues in the agency evaluation) to a collectively meaningful 
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object constructed by the activity system (object 2, e.g. an outlook on the essential 
principles of evaluation), and to a potentially shared or jointly constructed object (object 
3; e.g. a collaboratively constructed understanding about the central principles of the 
evaluation) (Engeström, 2001, p. 136, 2005, p. 63; Articles II & III). 
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Figure 9. Interacting activity systems in collaborative ethical reflection  
(see Engeström, 2005, p. 63) 
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In the process of collaborative ethical reflection, it is important to find a shared 
construction of the essential value dimensions in the evaluation process. Here it is 
possible to apply the FES’s framework designed to initiate discussion about the 
principles of evaluation and to serve as a description of the ethical perspectives for 
which an evaluator is morally responsible. Despite its limitations, the model can be 
applied as a heuristic framework for collaborative ethical reflection in the multivoiced 
network of the people involved in the evaluation process in order to outline a shared 
construction of the essential operational principles and their balance in the evaluation. 
Using this framework, it is possible to outline collaboratively the ethical perspectives 
for which an evaluator is morally responsible. The activity of the evaluator can be 
examined through balancing the value dimensions; the ideal is that the activity of the 
evaluator can be approved in terms of (a) scientific veracity, (b) methodological mastery 
and competence, (c) the integrity of the object of evaluation, and (d) social 
responsibility and the usefulness of the evaluation (Laitinen, 2008). 
Although the Fes’s framework has a postmodern emphasis, in collaborative ethical 
reflection the model is applied in a constructivist context where consensus is sought in 
order to support and expedite the decision process. Stake (1983, 2004, p. 210), for 
example, in his responsive evaluation approach follows the postmodern line that 
dismisses the possibility and desirability of unifying the values and judgments of 
different stakeholders. As Stake (2004, p. 210) states, the responsive evaluation “is 
respectful of multiple, even sometimes contradictory, standards held by different 
individuals and groups, with a reluctance to push for consensus.” The collaborative 
ethical reflection model accords rather with the constructivist approach advocated by 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) that aims to engage a truly representative group of 
stakeholders, to accord equal influence to each member, to assist the stakeholders in 
considering alternative values, and subsequently to aid them to reach consensus on and 
apply their preferred values (Lincoln & Guba, 2004; Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007, 
437).  
It must be noticed that the relations among stakeholders in a participatory 
evaluation process can be asymmetric, as power and conflict may hinder equal and 
genuine communication about the value of the practices evaluated. According to Baur et 
al. (2010) asymmetric relations can be dealt with constructively, focusing on the 
inclusion of marginalized groups, mutual learning, and good dialogue. In this task, the 
competences that the evaluator requires, in addition to more traditional social scientific 
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skills in data collection and analysis, are knowledge of and sensitivity to social 
dynamics, intensive engagement, reciprocity, and the capacity to change roles and 
respond actively to the dynamics of the process. 
7
    
Another essential challenge in collaborative ethical reflection may be that 
evaluators and other stakeholders can differ in their conceptualization of ethical issues 
(e.g. Alexander & Richman, 2008) and in their interpretation of ‘‘episodes’’ of ethical 
conflict (e.g. Morris, 2007). The collaborative ethical reflection presupposes that the 
evaluator is ready to confront and mediate between the countering views and arguments 
of stakeholders - to deal “with judgments, which to a significant degree lend their 
existence to some implicitly or explicitly established value criteria”, and which 
therefore are “always potentially debatable” (Valovirta, 2002, p. 65). Moreover, the 
possible achieved consensus that exceeds the countering arguments can also be debated, 
and therefore it cannot become indisputable knowledge.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that evaluators may exhibit an array of views on the 
purpose of evaluation and their own relationships and responsibilities to clients, 
program participants, groups within society, and the public at large - as the empirical 
research of Wolf et al. (2009) suggests. There are also differences in evaluators’ ability 
to identify the ethical issues when they analyze ethically challenging behavior 
(Desautels & Jacob, 2012).
8
 The way the evaluator perceives the ethical challenges is a 
                                                 
7
 Baur et al. (2010) have used a particular interpretation of responsive evaluation, linking the 
responsive evaluation paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Stake, 1975) to insights into the 
inclusion of marginalized or vulnerable stakeholder groups, narratives, storytelling, and ongoing 
dialogues in evaluation (e.g. Abma & Widdershoven, 2005; Widdershoven, 2001). The 
approach “uses hermeneutic dialogue to engage stakeholders in a learning process to help 
them better understand themselves and each other, and hence put their own viewpoints into 
perspective. In this way stakeholders gain a better understanding of a given practice through 
the combination and amalgamation of various different perspectives” (Baur et al., 2010, p. 235).  
This interpretation of responsive evaluation shares a number of basic concepts with 
participatory and empowerment evaluation approaches (Cousins & Whitmore, 1998; Fetterman 
et al., 1996; Greene, 2006; King, 2007) but can be distinguished by its conceptual and practical 
focus on hermeneutic dialogue (Widdershoven, 2001; Widdershoven & Abma, 2007). “If some 
stakeholder groups are in a vulnerable or marginalized position, the interactive techniques of 
participatory and empowerment evaluation can be used to give them ‘a say’ in the responsive 
evaluation process.. -- . The empowerment of all stakeholder groups, including those in 
vulnerable positions, follows from a good dialogical process in which all stakeholders involved 
change during the process by gaining mutual understanding of each others’ perspectives and 
mutual learning” (Baur et al., 2010, p. 235).  
8
 Desautels and Jacob (2012) suggest that an evaluator’s ability to identify ethical issues is 
partially explained by his or her tendency to place a greater importance either on humanistic 
and collective perspective (altruistic) or on a sponsor’s demands or the respect of norms related 
to confidentiality (corporatist). According to them, this ability also depends on other factors such 
31 
 
personal construction and, as Virtanen and Laitinen (2004) emphasize, the way the 
moral responsibility is carried at the end is always an evaluator’s individual choice. 
Also, in collaborative ethical reflection the emphasis is still on the evaluator’s personal 
commitment, although the ideal still is that valuing should take place within the context 
of understanding the “subjective meaningfulness” of the evaluation information – with 
the fundamental perspective that “reality is an ongoing, dynamic process and a truth is 
always relative to some particular frame of reference” (see Christie & Alkin, 2012, p. 
31; Carden & Alkin, 2012, p. 104). 
Applying Datta’s (2011) perspective on the politics of evaluation,9 collaborative 
ethical reflection represents “a political toolkit” that emphasizes e.g. extensive 
stakeholder involvement, collaboration, and social justice. Therefore, it more closely 
represents the “populist visions” of evaluation and politics with its appreciation of the 
diversity of interests and of the multiplicity of hopes and fears in a democracy, a 
commitment to evaluation as part of deliberative democracy, and a sense of evaluators 
as taking these multiple voices into account. However, at the same time this type of 
reflection shares a belief in the public interest or common good that transcends 
diversity, and a role for evaluators as sources of unbiased, fair information relating to 
this interest. 
                                                                                                                                               
as knowledge of the prescriptive norms in ethical matters, experience conducting evaluations, 
and the milieu and the working conditions within which he or she operate. 
9
 Datta (2011) describes how the 1960s and 1970s realization that evaluation is inherently 
political has led to at least two families of stances: populist and public interest. By ‘‘populist’’ 
Datta means an appreciation of the diversity of interests and of the multiplicity of hopes and 
fears in a democracy such as the United States, a commitment to evaluation as part of 
deliberative democracy, and a sense of evaluators as taking these multiple voices into account, 
including (for some evaluators) being advocates for the most disenfranchised. By ‘‘public 
interest’’ Datta means a belief in the public interest or common good as the highest common 
denominator transcending diversity and a role for evaluators as sources of unbiased, fair 
information relating to this interest. The “populist” stances embraced the politics of extensive 
stakeholder involvement, democratic deliberation, collaboration, social justice, and the 
empowerment of the disenfranchised. The public-interest stances continued to explore 
strategies for carrying out evaluations of high-stakes, controversial, large-scale national policy 
issues, while being wary of political bias in any form and from any source. Datta argues that 
these communalities could form a necessary political toolkit to join our methodological 
knowledge. As an example, in the US, according to Datta (2011, pp. 289-290), “among the 
predominant ideas are developmental, democratic, participatory, empowerment, and 
collaborative evaluation, social justice, indigenous ownership of evaluation, and organizational 
capacity building, all representing more populist visions of evaluation and politics”; while “the 
current of public interest evaluations also run strong and deep, particularly among our thought 
leaders associated with the organizations carrying out national evaluations of policies such as 
welfare reform, energy independence, agricultural sustainability --.” 
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3.4. Conclusions  
 
Because the aspect of the exercise of power is always connected with evaluation, ethics 
is a standard input and is the basis for establishing evaluation competence and skills and 
the development of procedures. The complexity of the position of evaluators in the 
government evaluation market challenges us to search for ethical guidelines. For this 
purpose, we need metaevaluations focusing on the ethical problems and dilemmas in 
evaluation practice.  
In this study, the complex nature of evaluation practice in multiactor networks is 
the starting point of the sketching of guidelines for ethical reflection. To this end, we 
have considered different approaches which have their strong and weak points. 
Communication can be seen as an essential element in the evaluation process. However, 
it seems that from speech acts it is impossible either to logically derive value 
propositions, moral duties, or obligations to act, or to present idealizing suppositions of 
such rules for dialogical situations as would ensure the production of universal norms 
for participants in a conversation. Still, normatively it is possible to set inevitable but 
general conditions for such communicative everyday practice and discursive will-
formation as might place the persons concerned in a situation in which they were able, 
on their own initiative and according to their own needs and views, to realize some 
concrete opportunities for a better and safer life (Habermas, 1985). Thus, it seems that 
the argumentation process is fruitful especially when the participants can set mutual 
understanding as a goal and commit to aspiring to that goal—although it will be 
impossible to reach it perfectly in practice. 
In the evaluation process, it is not only the organization of different views and 
action plans so as to reach a mutual understanding that advances evaluation utilization 
through argumentation. It is particularly complicated to compose a framework that can 
ensure clear guidelines for ethical evaluation practice in specific contextual situations 
and in a complex operational environment with conflicting role expectations. The use of 
neither extensive principles nor reflection on several theories can ensure a clear view of 
the situation. The ethics of evaluation is mostly concerned with balancing conflicting 
principles and values. In order to face this challenge, we need to commit ourselves to 
developing our skills in identifying, analyzing, and solving ethical problems and 
dilemmas. In this reflective, professional way of life — which neither removes conflict 
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and stress nor provides a rulebook answer to all dilemmas—we also need to commit 
ourselves to identifying and acquiring of professional virtues that make it possible to 
balance the essential value dimensions of evaluation.  
From the activity theoretical perspective, the ethical issues reflect contradictions, 
which are a moving force behind the change and the development of the activity system. 
The development, however, requires that the actors should become collectively oriented 
in the history of the activity and its objects, in the resolution of contradictions, and in 
the modeling, implementation, and examination of a new solution. In this endeavor, the 
multivoiced character of the network of interacting activity systems in the evaluation 
process needs to be taken into consideration. For example, the people involved in the 
evaluation process could create a collaborative forum where different essential 
perspectives can be taken into account in order to solve ethical problems. In this kind of 
process, it is possible to apply the analyzed model for ethical reflection in order to 
obtain a shared construction of the essential operational principles and their balance in 
the evaluation process.  
It must be noticed, however, that the cooperational construction of the value 
dimension cannot ensure a clear view of the situation. Although the model gives a 
heuristic framework with which to outline a shared construction of the essential 
principles and their balance in the evaluation process, the emphasis is still on the 
evaluator’s personal commitment. How the moral responsibility is carried at the end is 
always an evaluator’s individual choice. In the search for ethical guidelines, the 
evaluator may need many frameworks for ethical reflection— theories, standards, 
principles, the cooperational construction of value dimensions—as well as collegial and 
professional support in identifying, analyzing, and solving ethical problems and 
dilemmas. Supporting evaluators in their ethical reflection is still a considerable 
challenge.  
The approach construed in my study has pragmatic validity if it proves to be useful 
in evaluation research when depicting corresponding processes, in supporting 
professionals in their occupational reflections, and in developing cooperation in 
multiactor contexts. It also has communicative validity (Lyotard, 1979, 1984) if it 
creates new ideas, new differentiations, and new rules for the discourse of evaluation 
ethics. More empirical research is needed to explore how this activity theoretical model 
for collaborative ethical reflection could take into account the different perspectives in 
the multiactor networks of people involved in the evaluation processes. 
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Further study could be carried out through case studies on the application of the 
model for ethical reflection in an activity theoretically oriented evaluation process, 
where organizational change projects are evaluated taking the consequences of 
developmental effort and organizational learning as the starting point (see Kajamaa et 
al., 2009; Kallio & Saari, 2009; Saari et al., 2008; Saari & Kallio, 2011). In this way, 
the collaborative ethical reflection could be connected to the different phases of the 
cycle of expansive learning through evaluation.  
In order to more profoundly understand the problem field, the central role of the 
evaluator’s moral choices must also be considered. Therefore, it is important to study 
empirically the appearance of the themes of professional virtues, moral commitment, 
moral motivation, and prudentiality in the argumentation of evaluation. In order to 
outline evaluator’s professional virtues, it is possible to apply af Ursin’s (2007) 
approach, supplementing it with the FES’s model (Laitinen, 2002, 2008; Virtanen & 
Laitinen, 2004), which outlines the ethical perspectives for which an evaluator is 
morally responsible. From this perspective, we can ask what professional virtues make 
it possible to fulfill the challenges of the elementary value dimensions in the different 
evaluator roles – such as in the roles of manager, detective, designer, negotiator, 
diplomat, researcher, judge, reporter, use advocate, and learner (Skolits et al., 2009).   
It must be noted, however, that this kind of metaevaluation is in fact a continuation 
of the process it studies. Metaevaluation is also an instrument of the evaluation support 
to the central government; it is a part of the same management system in which 
evaluation plays an important role in the choice of public policy instruments by which 
governmental authorities wield their power when attempting to ensure support and 
effect social change. The awareness of this pragmatic function of metaevaluation affects 
the construction of the information in interviews.  
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